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Increasingly,  research  is  turning  to the ways  in which  social  context  impacts  decision  making  and  feed-
back  processing  in adolescents.  The  current  study  recorded  electroencephalography  to  examine  the
trajectory  of  development  across  adolescence,  with  a focus  on how  social  context  impacts  cognition
and  behaviour.  To that  end,  younger  (10–12  years)  and  older  (14–16  years)  adolescents  played  a  mod-
iﬁed  Taylor  Aggression  Paradigm  against  two virtual  opponents:  a low-provoker  and  a high-provoker.
During  the  task’s  decision  phase  (where  participants  select  punishment  for  their  opponent),  we  exam-
ined  two  event-related  potentials:  the N2  and  the late positive  potential  (LPP).  During  the  outcome
phase  (where  participants  experience  win  or loss  feedback),  we measured  the  feedback  related  negativ-
ity  (FRN).  Although  N2 amplitudes  did not  vary  with  provocation,  LPP  amplitudes  were  enhanced  undereedback
ecision making
high  provocation  for the younger  group,  suggesting  that  emotional  reactivity  during  the  decision  phase
was  heightened  for early  adolescents.  During  the  outcome  phase,  the  FRN  was  reduced  following  win
outcomes  under  high  provocation  for  both  groups,  suggesting  that a highly  provocative  social  opponent
may  inﬂuence  the  reward  response.  Collectively,  the  data  argue  that  social  context  is  an  important  factor
modulating  neural  responses  in  adolescent  behavioural  and  brain  development.
©  2015  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  Ltd.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND. Introduction
Adolescence is a period of major change, both behaviourally and
motionally (Blakemore and Mills, 2013; Blakemore and Robbins,
012; Crone and Dahl, 2012). Although some aspects of cogni-
ive and behavioural performance improve during adolescence, this
eriod is also marked by impaired decision making and emotional
ysregulation (Smith et al., 2012; Steinberg, 2008; Wahlstrom
t al., 2010; Yurgelun-Todd, 2007). The apparent tension between
he broad improvements observed for cognitive functioning and
elf-regulation from childhood to adolescence, and contrasting
bservations regarding affective control may  be understood from
everal points of view. For example, adolescence may  mark a period
hen cognitive functioning and emotional control are poorly inte-
rated or out of step with each other developmentally (Casey et al.,
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: p.fearon@ucl.ac.uk (R.M.P. Fearon).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dcn.2015.10.003
878-9293/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article u
y-nc-nd/4.0/).license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
2008; Steinberg, 2008). Alternatively, cognitive and affective per-
formance during adolescence may be more contextually bound,
particularly to the social context (Gardner and Steinberg, 2005).
These two broad accounts are not mutually exclusive.
Recent research has begun to explore how social contexts shape
adolescent decision making. In particular, the role of peer inﬂuence
on cognitive and behavioural performance has been examined in
a number of studies (Albert et al., 2013; Gardner and Steinberg,
2005). One domain that appears particularly prone to disruption by
peer inﬂuence is feedback processing (Chein et al., 2011; Segalowitz
et al., 2012). Despite a growing body of behavioural research, little
is known about the neural processes that underpin socially-driven
changes in cognition and behaviour throughout development,
and in adolescence particularly. To that end, we employed elec-
troencephalography (EEG) to examine the key neural processes
associated with decision making and feedback processing during a
competitive social task in younger (10–12 years) and older (14–16
years) adolescents. We  aimed to reveal the trajectory of develop-
ment across these two  age groups.
nder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
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.1. Feedback processing in adolescence
Feedback processing refers to the ability to evaluate, adapt and
odify future behaviour based on certain outcomes (such as ‘win’
r ‘loss’ outcomes) (Ridderinkhof et al., 2004). Although feedback
rocessing and feedback learning are vital for adaptive decision
aking (Banis et al., 2014), a number of studies indicate that ado-
escents make maladaptive decisions owing to deﬁcient feedback
rocessing. Speciﬁcally, adolescents are often reward dominant,
nd are biased towards reward-driven behaviour even when such
ehaviour is detrimental (Chein et al., 2011; Steinberg, 2008; Van
uijvenvoorde et al., 2008). Reward dominance refers to a motiva-
ional state characterized by increased approach behaviour, where
ndividuals are hyper-responsive to personal rewards (see Gray,
987; Quay, 1993). For example, Smith et al. (2012) report a U-
haped function between age and decision making performance
n the Iowa Gambling Task. In that study, children (8 years old)
nd older adolescents (17 years old) performed well on the Iowa
ambling task but younger adolescents (11–13 years) performed
oorly. Younger adolescents typically favoured card decks that pro-
uced high rewards but high punishments, resulting in the worst
verall outcomes (large net losses). This suggests a potential devel-
pmental regression in decision making during early adolescence.
his U-shaped developmental change has been previously linked
o an increase in impulsivity, but remains an open area of research
Casey et al., 2008).
Interestingly, earlier work using the Iowa Gambling Task did
ot show an inverted U function. Using four groups of partic-
pants (aged 6–9 years, 10–12 years, 13–15 years and 18–25
ears), Crone and van der Molen (2004) revealed an age-related
ncrease in performance – or at least an increase in participant’s
ensitivity to consequences. Given the discrepancy between exist-
ng research studies, the younger adolescents’ preference for the
igh reward/high punishment decks must be carefully interpreted.
or example, is that preference due to an increased desire for
ewards (so called ‘reward dominance’), or a decreased sensitiv-
ty to losses, or an adolescent-speciﬁc processing style that leads
o different expected values compared with those of children and
dults, or another explanation altogether? These possibilities can-
ot be disentangled in the Iowa Gambling Task, suggesting that
lternative tasks are needed to assess feedback processing in ado-
escents.
Unfortunately, most relevant developmental research has
ccurred within non-naturalistic contexts and has focused on neu-
ral or ‘cold’ cognitive tasks, rather than examining how feedback
rocessing is engaged by, or potentially impaired by, arousing social
ituations. This is problematic because it may  well be the case that
oung adolescents are particularly vulnerable to impaired deci-
ion making in affectively laden social (especially peer) contexts.
urthermore, recent ﬁndings indicate that performance monitor-
ng does not fully develop until late adolescence or adulthood (see
lakemore and Mills, 2013; Kar et al., 2012; Tamnes et al., 2013).
urther, the neural activity associated with feedback processing
as measured using functional magnetic resonance imaging) dif-
ers over the course of development. Van den Bos and colleagues
uggest that brain-based developmental differences to processing
eedback are not driven by valence but by the informative value of
timuli (van Den Bos et al., 2009a), and are related to IQ levels in
dolescents (van den Bos et al. 2012).
An examination of feedback processing in more naturalistic and
motionally arousing social contexts is therefore critical for under-
tanding the neurodevelopmental changes involved in cognitive
unction, performance monitoring and decision making between
ounger (10–12 years) and older (14–16 years) adolescents. In line
ith recommendations that the selection of age groups be narrow
nd theory-driven (Crone and Ridderinkhof, 2011), we attemptedtive Neuroscience 15 (2015) 58–66 59
to select two narrow age ranges that had the potential to capture
neural changes associated with feedback processing. The selection
of age ranges was based on a number of factors. First, we  aimed
to select participants who were all secondary school-aged. This
is because social relationships change after adolescents leave sec-
ondary school (at the age of 16 in the UK) for college or further
training pathways. By restricting the older adolescent group to
a maximum age of 16 years, this factor should have been mini-
mized. Second, given that the young adolescent group in Smith
et al.’s (2012) recent work showed poorer choices (compared to
those of children or adults), the early adolescent group in the
current study was  recruited to roughly overlap with that group.
A slightly younger age range was recruited here compared with
Smith et al. (10–12 years here compared with 11–13 years) in
order to ensure a sufﬁcient separation between our two  recruited
groups.
1.2. Using brain imaging to study feedback processing
Because adolescence is a period of dynamic neural change
(Choudhury et al., 2008), neuroimaging techniques such as EEG can
be employed to help unravel changes in decision making and feed-
back processing. For example, the feedback related negativity (FRN)
is an event-related potential (ERP) that indexes important aspects
of outcome evaluation. The FRN is a negative-going frontal compo-
nent that usually peaks 300 ms  after the presentation of feedback
(for example, a win or loss outcome) (Gehring and Willoughby,
2002). The FRN is typically larger (that is, more negative) when
the outcome is poor (a bad outcome). The FRN has an anterior
topography and is attributed to activation of the anterior cingu-
late cortex (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Holroyd and Coles,
2002). In adults speciﬁcally, the FRN distinguishes between out-
come valences (win vs. loss) and, in some studies, the magnitude
of the outcome (Dunning and Hajcak, 2007; Goyer et al., 2008).
This component is thought to reﬂect emotional appraisal of the
feedback (Hajcak et al., 2006), or violations of feedback expectancy
(Bellebaum et al., 2010; Oliveira et al., 2007; Potts et al., 2006), as the
FRN is larger (more negative) for worse outcomes (e.g., a loss rather
than a win) and is larger (more negative) when the outcome violates
the participant’s expectation. Interestingly, there is evidence for an
asymmetry between neural responses to wins and losses (Cohen
et al., 2007). Cohen et al. demonstrated that the FRN was  sensi-
tive to the probability of reward on win  trials, but not on loss trials.
Speciﬁcally, FRN amplitudes were shown to be more positive when
outcomes were better than expected (e.g., on win trials when the
probability of a win was  low). Huang and Yu recently demonstrated
that a larger (more negative) FRN is associated with feedback that
is ‘more’ than expected, rather than ‘worse’ than expected (Huang
and Yu, 2014).
In adults, an increasing body of work reveals that the FRN is
sensitive to social context. For example, the FRN has been shown
to distinguish positive and negative feedback, but only when par-
ticipants compete against another player, and not when playing
alone (Van Meel and Van Heijningen, 2010). In other words, the FRN
is increased in social contexts for adult participants. Furthermore,
FRN amplitude is correlated with feelings of subjective happi-
ness when participants compare their task winnings with another
player, or compete for winnings against that player (Rigoni et al.,
2010). The FRN is also inﬂuenced by factors such as social status (for
example based on performance on a cognitive task) (Boksem et al.,
2012). In that study, participants allocated to the low status group
were more likely to evaluate and attend more to their own perfor-
mance. Existing research therefore suggests that an arousing social
context increases the FRN, and this increase may be linked to the
heightened emotional signiﬁcance of outcomes in social situations.
Such modulation of feedback monitoring to take account of the
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ocial signiﬁcance of one’s decision-making is likely to be an impor-
ant neurodevelopmental achievement; however little research has
xamined how social processing and reward/outcome processing
ecome integrated during development.
.3. Social context and feedback processing
One interesting demonstration of the interaction between social
ontext and feedback processing employed a modiﬁed version of
he Taylor Aggression Paradigm (TAP; Taylor, 1967) in combination
ith EEG (Krämer et al., 2008). The TAP separates each trial into a
ecision making phase (where participants set a punishment for
heir opponent) and an outcome phase (where participants receive
in or loss feedback). Between the two phases, participants com-
ete with opponents on a simple task. The opponents can differ
n terms of how harshly they provoke (punish) the participant.
rämer et al. (2008) reported an increased frontal negativity (N2)
uring the decision phase for trait-aggressive adult participants
nder high provocation, suggesting that aggressive participants
ecruit greater cognitive resources when provoked. In a related
tudy, non-violent men  showed an increased N2 and were less
arsh in their punishment selections than violent men  during the
ecision phase (Wiswede et al., 2011). During the outcome phase,
he FRN differentiated win and loss outcomes. Although provoca-
ion did not impact FRN amplitude, the difference between win and
oss outcomes was larger in aggressive participants (Krämer et al.,
008). FRN amplitudes were also increased when participants were
assive recipients of punishment, who were prevented from pun-
shing their opponents (Wiswede et al., 2011). Collectively, these
ata suggest that a competitive or socially provocative context
lters the neural systems underlying decision making and feedback
rocessing – at least in adult participants.
To the best of our knowledge, only one study has employed EEG
o investigate the relationship between feedback processing and
ocial context in adolescents. Segalowitz et al. (2012) asked 15 year
ld boys to play a driving video game under two conditions: alone or
n the presence of two friends who verbally encouraged and advised
he participant during the game. FRN amplitudes decreased when
he participants played in the presence of peers compared to when
lone, suggesting that peer presence may  interfere with feedback
rocessing. Segalowitz et al.’s work conﬁrms that the FRN is use-
ul for investigating whether, and how, social context impacts an
dolescent’s ability to evaluate feedback. Interestingly, however,
egalowitz et al.’s ﬁndings of reduced FRN magnitude conﬂict with
dult research, where social context increased FRN magnitude (see
an Meel and Van Heijningen, 2010). The discrepancy between
dult and adolescent ﬁndings may  reﬂect an important develop-
ental effect: adults might engage in outcome monitoring more
uring social contexts (increased FRN), whereas adolescents may
ngage less in outcome monitoring in social situations (decreased
RN). Alternatively, the adolescent participants in Segalowitz et al.’s
tudy may  have been distracted in the presence of their peers, such
hat the experience of ‘win’ or ‘loss’ outcomes was less emotion-
lly salient (although distraction in this sense should have also
mpacted other ERP components by increasing latency jitter, which
as not the case). Another possibility is ‘social distraction’: Partici-
ants may  have devalued the loss outcome when playing in a social
ontext, because the outcome of crashing a virtual car may  be less
alient in the presence of peers. Finally, it is useful to note that
he design of the tasks differed across the aforementioned adult
nd adolescent research studies, as adult participants directly com-
eted against peers (Van Meel and Van Heijningen, 2010), whereas
dolescents were merely observed by their peers (Segalowitz et al.,
012). It may  be the direct competitive aspect of the social situation
hat works to enhance the FRN.tive Neuroscience 15 (2015) 58–66
1.4. The current study
Given the need to better understand how social context impacts
the trajectory of decision making and feedback processing in ado-
lescence, the current study recorded EEG while younger (aged
10–12 years) and older (aged 14–16 years) adolescents played
a modiﬁed TAP against two virtual opponents: a low-provoker
and a high-provoker. The modiﬁed TAP attempts to balance the
need for an appropriately controlled, scientiﬁcally tractable exper-
iment with the need for an ecologically valid task that captures
the emotional and cognitive dynamics of real world adoles-
cent interactions. Following Krämer et al. (2008), this paradigm
allowed us to separately examine the neural correlates of pun-
ishment selection (using the N2) and feedback processing (using
the FRN) and varying conditions of social provocation. We  also
aimed to investigate participants’ emotional evaluation of their
punishment selection decisions. To that end, the late positive
potential (LPP) component was also measured during the decision
phase.
We hypothesized that younger and older adolescents would
react to the opponents’ provocation and punish high-provoking
opponents more than low-provoking opponents. Given the devel-
opmental trajectories discussed above, it was predicted that
younger adolescents would be more reactive to the social context
than older adolescents and select harsher punishments for their
opponents. We  suspected that the group differences in behaviour
would be paralleled by group differences in brain activity, such
that N2 amplitudes would also be increased in younger adoles-
cents, as the N2 has been shown to be enhanced in participants
who select higher behavioural punishments (see Krämer et al.,
2008). It was  also expected that the decision phase LPP would
be larger during high provocation vs. low provocation, because
high provocation is, presumably, a more arousing emotional
context.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Participants
Participants were 60 adolescents recruited from North London
secondary schools. 30 participants (15 female) made up the young
adolescent group (mean age: 11.87 years, range: 10.48–12.99
years) and 30 participants (15 female) made up the older adoles-
cent group (mean age: 15.65 years, range: 14.05–16.76 years). All
participants and their parents provided written, informed consent.
Participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The study
was approved by the Psychology Research Ethics Committee at the
University of Cambridge, UK.
2.2. Stimuli and apparatus
All stimuli were presented on a light grey background on a
Dell 17-inch monitor, refreshing at 60 Hz. In the Decision Phase,
the stimulus of interest was  the words ‘Think about punishment’,
which appeared in the centre of the screen in black text (Arial
font, occupying an area of 8 cm × 2 cm). In the Outcome Phase, the
stimuli of interest were images of a green tick (indicating a win
outcome) or a red cross (indicating a loss outcome). The feedback
stimuli appeared in the centre of the screen and occupied an area
of 5.5 cm × 5.5 cm.  Punishment outcomes screens were followed by
an aversive auditory stimulus (white noise). This noise increased in
amplitude with increasing punishment level. The experiment was
programmed and presented using E-Prime 2.0 software (Psychol-
ogy Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA).
H.L. Pincham et al. / Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience 15 (2015) 58–66 61
Fig. 1. (A) shows the Think screen, where participants were instructed to consider the level of punishment for their opponent. (B) shows the outline of one experimental trial.
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rarticipants were initially asked to think about the potential punishment that they w
between 10p and 60p) for their opponent. Participants then played a Go/No-go gam
y  another win or loss outcome.
.3. Procedure
The experiment was a modiﬁed version of the Taylor Aggres-
ion Paradigm (Taylor, 1967). Participants were informed that they
ould be taking part in an online, multi-player game, competing in
urn against two different opponents. The game that participants
layed against their opponents was a simple Go/No-go game. In
eality, however, no other players existed and participants were
ffectively playing against a pre-programmed set of responses by
he two (virtual) opponents. To enhance the believability of the
ocial interaction, participants were introduced to their opponents
ia a ﬁctional web-camera. Participants were able to see their oppo-
ents waving at them before the onset of the block (these were
re-recorded videos). The opponents were adolescents wearing a
imilar EEG net, and were approximately the same age and gen-
er as the participants (we had a total of 8 ﬁctional opponents to
hoose from, to match with the participants). This aspect of the
xperiment appeared to solidify the believability of the task, and
o participants indicated disbelief in the opponents’ existence.
The experiment consisted of four blocks of 14 trials/block. As
hown in Fig. 1, a single trial comprised the following sequence
f events: Think screen, Punishment Selection, a Go/No-go game,
eedback (win or loss outcome), a Go/No-go game, Feedback (win
r loss outcome). Punishment selection occurred at the beginning of
ach trial. During this time, a screen with the word ‘Think’ appeared
n the centre of the monitor for 1500 ms,  and participants were
nstructed to use this time to consider the level of punishment that
hey would like to select for their opponent (as per Krämer et al.,
008). The Think screen was replaced by a display that enabled
articipants to select a potential punishment for their opponent,
ith punishment options ranging from 10p to 60p, increasing in
0p intervals. Participants were informed that the level of punish-
ent they selected would be administered to their opponent if the
pponent lost either of the two games during that trial. Within a
iven trial, participants could win both games, lose both games,
r win one game but not the other (in either order). However, the
rogramme ensured that, for each participant, the distribution of
in/loss outcomes was 50% win and 50% loss (overall, not per trial).
he task was designed in this manner to equate the number of win
s. loss outcomes for the ERP analyses (unfortunately, however, the
oss trials were subject to greater movement artifacts, as explained
elow).
Because we were primarily interested in feedback processing,
e do not present data concerning performance on the Go/No-go
ame. The Go/No-go game was included so that participants could
ompete against their opponents in an engaging task, and could
herefore be shown win or loss outcomes, which were supposedly
ased on their Go/No-go performance.
Feedback occurred after every Go/No-go game. During feedback,
 green tick or red cross appeared in a circle (diameter = 5 cm)  in the
entre of the screen for 2000 ms  to respectively indicate a win or
oss outcome on the immediately preceding Go/No-go game. Par-
icipants were then informed about the level of punishment that
heir opponent had chosen to inﬂict on them. Participants were
nformed about the level of punishment selected by their opponent
egardless of whether they had won or lost that game. like to select for their opponent. Participants then selected the level of punishment
lowed by a win or loss outcome and then played another Go/No-go game followed
Participants competed for a ﬁnancial reward. Every win out-
come was  credited with 40p and a loss resulted in ﬁnancial
punishment ranging between 10p and 60p, according to the oppo-
nent’s punishment ‘selection’. As indicated above, however, the
opponents did not exist and therefore the opponents did not ‘select’
punishments. Instead, the punishments administered by the two
opponents were predetermined: one opponent was programmed
as a ‘low provoker’ (administering punishments of 10p, 20p or 30p,
mean punishment = 20p) and the other was  programmed as a ‘high
provoker’ (administering punishments of 40p, 50p and 60p, mean
punishment = 50p). The type of opponent (low provoker vs. high
provoker) alternated between blocks and the type of opponent
ﬁrst encountered (low provoker vs. high provoker) was counter-
balanced across participants. There were four blocks in total, such
that each participant played against the low provoking opponent
twice, and against the high provoking opponent twice. Participants
were paid in cash the amount of money that they won during the
game. Due to the fact that wins, losses and opponent punishment
selections were predetermined, payments ranged from £3.50 to
£6.50 (a range was necessary to ensure that all participants did not
win the exact same amount, which would have detracted from the
believability of the task).
The game was  thoroughly explained to participants, and the
data collection did not begin until the experimenter was  con-
ﬁdent that the participant fully understood the nature of the
task. The experimenter was  present while participants played
at least ﬁve practice trials against the computer. Additional
practice trials could be played before the experiment proper, if
required.
As participants were recruited from local schools in the area,
debrieﬁng occurred after all participants had taken part in the study
(rather than at the end of each individual participant’s session). This
decision was  made to ensure that participants could not inform
future participants about the true nature of the task. The task
appeared to be highly realistic, believable and engaging for partic-
ipants. The pre-recorded videos of the other ‘online players’ were
particularly useful in maintaining the coverstory.
2.4. EEG acquisition and preprocessing
EEG was  recorded using the Electrical Geodesics Inc. 128-
channel hydrocel geodesic sensor net system at a sampling rate
of 250 Hz. An anti-aliasing low-pass ﬁlter of 70 Hz was applied
during data acquisition. Ofﬂine, the data were band-pass ﬁltered
between 0.1 and 30 Hz and recomputed to an average reference.
The continuous EEG was segmented into epochs between −200 and
700 ms  relative to the epoching stimulus. Spline interpolation was
carried out on individual channels if required. The mean percent-
age and range of interpolated channels was 6.07% (range: 0–9.3%).
Independent component analysis was run using FASTER to remove
stereotyped artifacts (Nolan et al., 2010). Epochs were excluded
from analysis if they met  any of the following artifact rejection
criteria: voltage deviations exceeded 150 V relative to baseline or
the peak to peak moving amplitude exceeded 150 V in a 200 ms
moving window.
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.5. Data analysis
.5.1. Behavioural data
The punishment level selected by participants in the ﬁrst trial
f the experiment (before participants had interacted with the
pponents) was used as an index of unprovoked aggression, and
ompared across the two  groups using an independent-samples
-test. In order to investigate how participants’ punishment selec-
ions were inﬂuenced by provocation and age, we  calculated
verage punishment selections under low and high provocation,
nd subjected these data to a two-way ANOVA with provoca-
ion (low vs. high) and group (younger vs. older) as factors. To
xplore how participants’ decision making was impacted by their
pponent’s behaviour, we calculated the magnitude of difference
etween the punishment level selected by the participant and
he punishment level ‘selected’ by their opponent on the immedi-
tely preceding trial. A positive score indicates that the participant
elected a larger punishment than was selected by their opponent
n the previous trial. Punishment difference scores were subjected
o an ANOVA with provocation (low vs. high) as within-subjects
actors and group (younger vs. older) as a between-subjects factor.
.5.2. ERP data
EEG data from both the decision phase and the outcome phase
ere analysed. To achieve these analyses, ERPs were separately
ocked to two different events: the onset of the Think screen and
he onset of the Outcome screen.
.5.2.1. Decision phase. Following Krämer et al. (2008) we  exam-
ned the N2 evoked during the decision phase by segmenting the
ontinuous EEG data into epochs between −200 and 700 ms  rel-
tive to the Think screen. The N2 component was  deﬁned as the
ost negative deﬂection occurring at Fz (electrode 11 in the hydro-
el geodesic sensor net) in the period 200–400 ms  after stimulus
nset. Peak N2 latency was calculated in this window and subjected
o an ANOVA with provocation (low vs. high) as a within-subjects
actor and group (younger vs. older) as a between-subjects factor.
ecause the temporal latency of the N2 differed between the two
roups, the grand average peak latency (averaged across partici-
ants) was calculated for each group and mean amplitudes were
xtracted in a window extending 50 ms  before and 50 ms  after the
eak latency for each age group. Therefore, for younger adolescents,
ean amplitudes were calculated 280–380 ms  after stimulus onset
nd for older adolescents, 220–320 ms  after stimulus onset.
The LPP was examined in the epochs locked to the Think screen.
he LPP was deﬁned at a centro-parieto-occiptal scalp location
round POz (electrodes 62, 66, 67, 71, 76, 77 and 84 in the hydrocel
eodesic sensor net). As per Cuthbert et al. (2000) we  examined
he LPP in the period 400–700 ms  after stimulus onset. A single
xtended time window was  used to investigate this effect because
here was no clear-cut peak that could be used to determine sep-
rate group windows. Mean activity in this period was analysed
sing an ANOVA with provocation and age as factors.
.5.2.2. Outcome phase. Data were epoched relative to the onset
f the Win  and Loss outcome screens (−200 to 700 ms). Following
revious research (Yeung and Sanfey, 2004; Zottoli and Grose-Fifer,
012), activity at FCz (electrode 6 in the hydrocel geodesic sensor
et) was used to calculate the FRN. Movement artifacts following
he loss outcome screen prevented an examination of the electro-
hysiological activity evoked by negative outcomes. Consequently,
he FRN analysis was restricted to the ERPs evoked by the win
utcome. A peak latency analysis in the period 200–400 ms  after
utcome presentation revealed signiﬁcant latency shifts between
he two groups. As a result, mean amplitudes were extracted
n a window extending 50 ms  before and 50 ms  after the peaktive Neuroscience 15 (2015) 58–66
latency identiﬁed in each group. This corresponded to 280–380 ms
for younger adolescents and 232–332 ms  for older adolescents.
Mean amplitudes were analysed using an ANOVA with provoca-
tion (low vs. high) and group (younger vs. older) as factors. For all
behavioural, physiological and ERP data, Sidak corrected post hoc
contrasts were used to probe signiﬁcant interaction effects, where
required.
2.5.3. Relationship between behavioural and ERP data
To uncover the way  in which punishment selection was asso-
ciated with neural indices of decision making and feedback
processing, we  calculated correlations between behavioural meas-
ures of punishment selection and ERP difference scores. The two
behavioural variables of interest were participants’ ﬁrst punish-
ment selection and mean punishment selection differences (mean
punishment selection under high provocation minus mean punish-
ment selection under low provocation). ERP difference scores were
deﬁned as mean amplitude under high provocation minus mean
amplitude under low provocation. Difference scores were calcu-
lated separately for the N2, the LPP and the FRN (on win trials).
These correlational analyses were conducted because they have the
potential to reveal which neural correlates are linked with punish-
ment selection on this competitive task.
3. Results
3.1. Behavioural data
Although initial punishment selection was statistically equiva-
lent across the two  groups (F < 1), average punishment selections
(across the entire experiment) were higher in younger adoles-
cents (F(1,58) = 4.7, p = .035, 2 = .074). For both groups, punishment
selections were larger under high provocation compared with
low provocation (F(1,58) = 49.2, p < .001, 2 = .459). No interac-
tion between age group and provocation was  detected, indicating
that high provocation enhanced punishment selections for both
groups of participants (F < 1). The analysis investigating partic-
ipant/opponent punishment differences indicated that younger
adolescents were more reactive to the social context because their
punishment difference scores were larger than older adolescents’
punishment difference scores (F(1,58) = 4.4, p = .041, 2 = .070).
These data are shown in Table 1.
3.2. ERP data
3.2.1. Decision phase
The Think N2 peaked 60 ms  later for younger adolescents
than for older adolescents (F(1,58) = 9.9, p = .003, 2 = .146) and
was signiﬁcantly larger (more negative) for younger adolescents
(F(1,58) = 6.3, p = .015, 2 = .098). For both N2 amplitude and latency
measures, no main or interaction effects involving provocation
were statistically signiﬁcant (largest F = 3.3). These data are shown
in Fig. 2.
With respect to the LPP, there were no main effects of age group
(F < 1) or provocation (F(1,58) = 2.4, p = .127, 2 = .040). However, a
signiﬁcant provocation × group interaction revealed that provoca-
tion impacted the LPP more strongly for younger adolescents than
older adolescents (F(1,58) = 4.1, p = .049, 2 = .065). Sidak-corrected
post hoc comparisons conﬁrmed that mean LPP amplitude was
more positive under high provocation for younger adolescents
(p = .015), but did not differ across provocation levels for older ado-
lescents (p = .742). These data are shown in Fig. 3.3.2.2. Outcome phase
As shown in Fig. 4, the FRN evoked by Win  outcomes was sig-
niﬁcantly delayed for younger adolescents (F(1,58) = 13.3, p = .001,
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Table  1
Mean behavioural data from the TAP for the younger and older adolescent groups. Participants’ punishment selections could range from 1 (10p punishment) to 6 (60p
punishment). Initial punishment selection refers to the punishment level selected by the participant on the ﬁrst trial of the experiment, before receiving any outcome
information. Average punishments refer to mean punishment levels selected by participants across all trials with the ‘low provocation’ opponent, and all trials with the
‘high  provocation’ opponent. Higher values are indicative of larger punishments. Punishment difference scores refer to the magnitude of difference between the punishment
selected by the opponent on trial X, and the punishment selected by the participant on trial X + 1. A more positive score indicates that the participant selected a larger
punishment than was  selected by their opponent on the previous trial. Standard deviations are shown in brackets.
Initial punishment selection Average punishment Punishment difference scores
Low provocation opponent High provocation opponent
Younger 3.37 (1.75) 4.04 (1.53) 5.10 (0.73) 1.034 (0.17)
Older 3.27 (1.57) 3.52 (1.25) 4.45 (1.08) 0.447 (0.20)
Fig. 2. ERPs as a function of age and provocation level (low or high), time-locked to
the onset of the ‘Think’ screen. ERPs are shown at Fz (electrode 11 in the hydrocel
geodesic sensor net). Grey boxes show the time windows used to calculate mean
amplitudes.
Fig. 3. ERPs as a function of age and provocation level (low or high), time-locked
to  the onset of the ‘Think’ screen. Grey boxes show the time windows used to
calculate mean amplitudes. Difference topographies (low provocation minus high
provocation) are also shown. Difference topographies are shown for the time win-
dow  400–700 ms  after the onset of the ‘Think’ screen. Small black circles on the
topographies highlight the electrodes used in the ERP analysis.
Fig. 4. ERPs as a function of age and provocation level (low or high), time-locked to
the onset of the outcome screen. ERPs are shown at FCz (electrode 6 in the hydrocel
geodesic sensor net). Grey boxes show the time windows used to calculate mean
amplitudes.
2 = .186). For both groups, the amplitude of this component was
more negative under low provocation than under high provoca-
tion (F(1,58) = 4.1, p = .047, 2 = .066), and was  more negative in
younger adolescents than older adolescents (F(1,58) = 5.2, p = .026,
2 = .082). The group × provocation interaction effect was not sta-
tistically robust (F < 1), suggesting that the impact of provocation on
the FRN was equivalent across the two groups. Note that the same
results were obtained when a single time window (250–350 ms)
was used for both groups (provocation: F(1,58) = 5.6, p = .021,
2 = .088; age: F(1,58) = 3.1, p = .082, 2 = .051).
3.3. Relationships between behavioural and ERP data
None of the ERP measures (N2, LPP or FRN) signiﬁcantly corre-
lated with participants’ ﬁrst punishment selections (N2: r = .122,
p = .354; LPP: r = −.232, p = .074; FRN: r = .019, p = .885). Further,
the N2 and FRN were not related to average punishment selec-
tion difference scores (N2: r = −.027, p = .839; FRN: r = .000, p = .998).
However, LPP difference scores correlated positively with the mag-
nitude of punishment selection differences (r = .263, p = .042). In
other words, a larger LPP amplitude difference between high and
low provoking opponents corresponded to a larger punishment
selection difference between high and low provoking opponents.
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. Discussion
The current study examined the effect of social provocation
n neural indices of decision making and feedback processing.
peciﬁcally, the trajectory of development between early and late
dolescence was mapped by comparing 10–12 year olds and 14–16
ear olds. Moving beyond traditional ‘cold’ decision making tasks
uch as the Stroop or Wisconsin card sorting tasks, we used a
ocially arousing version of the TAP. This task aims to enhance
cological validity by engaging participants in a competitive social
nvironment that requires reaction to low or high provocation
y a peer. By examining neural markers of punishment selec-
ion (N2, LPP) and feedback processing (FRN) under conditions of
igh and low peer provocation, we were able to examine neuro-
evelopmental differences across two groups of adolescents. The
esults are discussed below.
.1. Punishment selection: decision phase
Perhaps unsurprisingly, social provocation impacted decision
aking in both younger and older adolescents. For both groups,
he magnitude of average punishment selection was larger under
igh provocation than low provocation. Although both groups were
ffected by provocation, punishment selection responses differed
cross the two groups. As hypothesized, average punishment selec-
ion scores were larger for the younger adolescent group than the
lder adolescent group. High punishment selections by younger
dolescents appeared to reﬂect a reactive (rather than pro-active)
esponse to the social context. This is because initial punishment
elections were equivalent across the two groups, yet the magni-
ude of difference between the participant’s punishment selection
core and their opponent’s previous punishment selection score
as larger in younger adolescents. These results are consistent with
he observation that the regulation of reactive control develops
rom childhood through adolescence (Barker et al., 2006; Killikelly
nd Szu˝cs, 2013; Tremblay, 2000).
We  observed two ERP components during the decision phase
f this task (N2 and LPP), time-locked to the onset of the ‘Think’
creen. Unlike Krämer et al. (2008), the decision phase N2 was  not
odulated by provocation. However, in Krämer et al.’s study, N2
ifferences were only observed when high trait aggressive partic-
pants exhibited low levels of aggression. Therefore, we might not
ecessarily expect N2 differences here (as we did not recruit high
rait aggressive adolescents).
Examination of the LPP helped to reveal participants’ emotional
valuation during the decision phase of the task. Critically we found
vidence that LPP amplitudes in this task were signiﬁcantly larger
nder high provocation vs. low provocation for younger adoles-
ents but not older adolescents. The LPP is typically elicited in
esponse to emotional stimuli, is larger (more positive) following
rousing stimuli (such as unpleasant images) (Bradley et al., 2007;
uthbert et al., 2000; Naumann et al., 1992), and reﬂects sustained
rocessing of arousing stimuli, and is largely unaffected by early
ttention (Codispoti et al., 2007). The LPP is argued to index an
bligatory motivational system (Lang et al., 1997). This explanation
s consistent with evidence suggesting that the neural generators of
he LPP comprise emotional and motivational brain circuits includ-
ng the amygdala, insula and cingulate cortex (Liu et al., 2012). Our
ndings therefore suggests that, during the decision phase, emo-
ional reactivity is heightened for younger adolescents which may
n turn explain their high punishment selections. This notion is
upported by the fact that LPP difference scores correlated with
unishment selection difference scores, suggesting that the LPP
s a useful neural marker of decision making in the modiﬁed TAP
ask.tive Neuroscience 15 (2015) 58–66
4.2. Feedback processing: outcome phase
In addition to impacting decision making, social provocation
inﬂuenced a neural measure of feedback processing: the FRN.
Due to artifacts on loss trials, we  were only able to examine the
FRN evoked by win  outcomes. The inability to examine loss trials
constitutes a major limitation of the current work, because FRN
amplitudes are typically larger for worse outcomes. Therefore, we
would have expected greater variance in FRN amplitudes during
the loss trials, and arguably, the loss trials would have been more
likely to reveal important age × provocation interaction effects. The
fact that the analyses were restricted to win trials means that the
current study was  unable to fully examine the impact of outcome
(win vs. loss) on the FRN. Participants were asked to try and avoid
expressing their feelings (e.g., outrage, disappointment, pleasure)
until the end of the outcome screen. Despite the instructions to try
and remain still during feedback, we speculate that the loss trials
were lost to movement artifacts due to the affective nature of the
task. Indeed, if one assumes that the degree of movement artifacts
is reﬂective of a participants’ emotional reaction to the feedback,
then it could be inferred that participants regarded the loss trials
as more emotionally engaging, such that their physical response to
those trials could not be adequately suppressed.
For both groups of participants, the FRN was reduced (i.e. more
positive) following a win outcome under high provocation com-
pared with a win outcome under low provocation. The FRN is
typically reduced following more positive or pleasing outcomes,
consistent with the notion that the FRN reﬂects the emotional or
value-appraisal of the outcome (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002;
Goyer et al., 2008; Hajcak et al., 2006). In this study, a win under
high provocation was  more rewarding than a win under low provo-
cation, which is arguably why the FRN was  more positive under
high provocation. Wins under high provocation may  have been
more emotionally pleasing for participants, as they felt satisﬁed
in having beaten a highly provocative opponent. Additionally,
the size of the FRN could reﬂect the magnitude of the expected
outcome. Speciﬁcally, the potential loss under high provocation
(average loss 50p) was  larger than the potential loss under low
provocation (average loss 20p). Because all wins were associated
with a 40p gain (regardless of provocation condition), wins under
high provocation were also associated with a larger prediction
error (and a more positive FRN) than wins under low provoca-
tion.
The impact of provocation on FRN amplitude observed here is in
contrast to data presented by Krämer et al. (2008) where FRN ampli-
tudes in adult participants were not modulated by provocation.
It might be the case that, in the context of the TAP task, ado-
lescent participants are more emotionally invested in the task so
that their neural responses to feedback (especially during the win
trials) were heightened. This makes sense given that adolescents
tend to be reward dominant and are therefore more likely to focus
attention on feedback stimuli, particularly in a socially-competitive
context (Chein et al., 2011; Steinberg, 2008; Van Duijvenvoorde
et al., 2008).
To the best of our knowledge, only one other study has exam-
ined the impact of social context on the FRN in male adolescent
participants (Segalowitz et al., 2012). Our study extends those
ﬁndings by showing that the nature of a social context (high vs.
low provocation) and not simply the presence or absence of a
social context, impacts FRN amplitude. We  also demonstrate that
a social context impacts FRN amplitude in a mixed gender sample,
and that the impact of social context on FRN amplitude is appar-
ent in adolescents as young as 11 years. Segalowitz et al. (2012)
argued that peer inﬂuence invoked a decrease in activation of the
medial prefrontal cortex (indexed by FRN activity), and our ﬁndings
may  be understood in similar terms. Contrary to our expectations,
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rovocation impacted FRN amplitude in the same manner for
oth age groups. Because all of our participants were adolescents,
nd adolescents across this age range have been previously docu-
ented as reward dominant (see Steinberg, 2005; Van Leijenhorst
t al., 2010), it is possible that differences would emerge if a wider
ange of ages (both older and younger than those included here)
ere considered, or if adolescents were compared directly with
dults.
.3. Conclusion
The current study responds to the contemporary literature’s
ocus on integrative examinations of social/cognitive/emotional
evelopment. Recently, Blakemore and Mills (2013) argued that
hanges in the adolescent’s social environment interact with nor-
al  cognitive development, such that social contexts must be
onsidered when examining adolescent behaviour and cognition.
vidence from neuroimaging also highlights the importance of
ocial context in neurocognitive development throughout adoles-
ence. For example, in their review of developmental neuroimaging
tudies, Crone and Dahl (2012) suggest that theories attributing
dolescent behaviour to immature frontal lobes are overly simplis-
ic. Instead, adolescent behaviour is driven by complex interactions
etween cognitive, social and affective contexts (see Segalowitz
t al., 2012; van den Bos et al., 2009b; Van Duijvenvoorde et al.,
008). By combining the modiﬁed TAP with EEG recordings, we
ere able to reveal that social provocation inﬂuences decision mak-
ng and feedback processing, and that these processes may  change
ver adolescence.
Despite its contribution to understanding the complex inter-
ctions involved in adolescent development, this study has some
imitations that require acknowledgement. First, we were unable
o examine the FRN on loss trials due to artifacts on those trials. Sec-
nd, we only examined normative developmental samples across
wo narrow age ranges. This constitutes both a strength and a lim-
tation because, on the one hand, we were able to validate this
ask in a developmental sample, and provide normative data. On
he other hand, the same results may  not hold for different age
roups or clinical populations. Further, it is important to note that
his study does not include young children or adults. It is there-
ore not possible to reveal whether the current results are speciﬁc
o adolescent development or development more generally. Future
esearch using engaging tasks that are appropriate for use across a
ide age range will help to uncover whether the current results are
dolescent speciﬁc. Future research should also consider including
dditional non-social control conditions that would help to delin-
ate whether the obtained results are purely expectation based or
ocially driven.
In summary, the current ﬁndings provide further support for the
iew that social context, and in this case social provocation, impacts
n behavioural and neural aspects of decision making and feedback
rocessing. The relationships between provocation, decision mak-
ng and feedback processing showed a developmental trajectory,
s they were not stable across early and later adolescent groups.
oung adolescents appear to be harsher in their punishment selec-
ion and more emotionally responsive during this decision phase
f the modiﬁed TAP. Feedback processing, as indicated by the FRN,
lso appears to be impacted by social provocation in both younger
nd older adolescents. Collectively, these data suggest that decision
aking improves from early to late adolescence whereas feedback
rocessing remains relatively stable. Overall, the current results
ighlight the importance of viewing adolescent neurocognitive
evelopment as a complex interplay of social and cognitive change,
here social context may  act as a key a modulator of behaviour and
eural processing.tive Neuroscience 15 (2015) 58–66 65
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